Background Paper
The Learning Generation

Children and Adolescents Affected by Crises

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Background paper for the International Commission on Financing Global Education

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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRED</td>
<td>Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPDC</td>
<td>Education Policy and Data Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GMR</td>
<td>Global Monitoring Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRIO</td>
<td>Peace Research Institute Oslo</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>UIS</td>
<td>UNESCO Institute for Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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Executive Summary

In 2016 it was estimated that 75 million children and adolescents were directly affected by crises, with crises being defined as those countries affected by conflict, natural disasters or a mixture of both. Many studies have documented the adverse impact of conflict and natural disasters on the educational attainment of children and adolescents, indicating that without attention to these crises the targets set out under the Sustainable Development Goals agenda will not be fulfilled by 2030. Evidence is supportive of inclusive and equitable education systems playing a crucial role in mitigating the worst effects of conflict and natural disaster for countries affected by crises.

Based on past trends, forward-looking projections indicate that the number of natural disasters, and those affected by them, are set to increase between now and 2030. Projections on conflict present two schools of thought with the first being that conflict is set to decrease and be concentrated in a smaller number of countries in the years ahead; the alternative hypothesis is that with the frequency of natural disasters increasing in the years ahead, conflict will be likely to increase. Clearly, in the case of either scenario, the effects of crises are not evenly felt by populations; children and adolescents, amongst the most vulnerable, risk having their access to schooling permanently reversed which is why the Sustainable Development Goals on education specifically mentions children and adolescents in these categories being in need of targeted support.

Much work has been done in recent years to try to pinpoint the effects of conflict to quantify the impact that it might have on accessing schooling. This paper presents an overview of the literature; while there is no doubt that children and adolescents in conflict are having their schooling cut short, the current evidence base makes it difficult to – in most cases – categorically conclude that those children and adolescents who are out of school are not attending school as oppose to other underlying influences at play. There are a number of gaps in both data availability and the current research base, which need further attention to strengthen the argument of a causal relationship between conflict and this affecting the likelihood of children and adolescents being out of school. The findings and recommendations of the paper are that:

1. **There is a paucity of reliable and timely education data, across time, for conflict-affected countries.** To improve policy-makers understanding of the estimated impact of conflict on education, an investment in collecting more timely and accurate data in these countries is absolutely imperative.

2. **Much of the current unit of analysis takes the nation state as the unit of measure despite conflict increasingly being situated within particular geographical hotspots.** As well as improving data availability of conflict-affected countries, collection of sub-national data is crucial particularly in contexts where the conflict is localised.

3. **Education statistics for refugees and IDPs are currently poor making it difficult to track progress for those for whom the SDG targets are furthest out of reach.** Global institutions such as the UNHCR and UNESCO-UIS must focus efforts on collection education indicators specifically for refugees and IDPs. These statistics must also be disaggregated by gender and by age.

4. **The complexity of the inter-relationship between fragility, conflict and decreased educational attainment has not been adequately explored.** Given that there is a good body of evidence that fragility is both a cause of conflict and decreased educational attainment, more research needs to focus on the effects of fragility and whether this is an important pre-requisite in determining the likelihood of children and adolescents being out of school in conflict settings.
**Introduction**

A crisis can be defined as that caused by either man-made conflict, natural disasters or in the case of some countries, both. These crises can severely impede the functioning of society and entail large human, social, material, economic or environmental losses; they can also happen suddenly (rapid onset) or can be chronic (slow onset disasters). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), endorsed by the international community in September 2015, makes strong reference to both conflict and natural disasters. SDG 16 (Target 1) aims to “significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates elsewhere,” while SDG 11 (Target 5) aims to “significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of affected people and decrease by y% the economic losses relative to GDP caused by disasters” (UN, 2015). Crises, whether man-made or as a consequence of natural disaster, affect the most vulnerable populations first and foremost which include children; of all the humanitarian appeals in 2015, children and adolescents aged 0-18 made up half of the total populations affected. The effects of crises, therefore, can have very adverse consequences for the schooling of children and young adolescents with the disruption leading to them dropping out of school.

During and after the onset of armed conflict, the impact on education can be immense either directly or indirectly. In the majority of countries in armed conflict, government forces and non-state groups have used schools as military bases or as places within which to store weaponry. Between 2000 and 2015, education institutions were used in at least 26 countries in conflict (GCPEA, 2015). This makes schools, student and teachers more vulnerable to being targeted and there is, indeed a clear upward trend in schools being targeted during armed conflict; as of 2014 the numbers of education institutions deliberately targeted totalled 345 – this was a 17-fold increase compared to 2000 (REAL, 2016). The 2014 attack on a boys’ school in Pakistan which killed 144 and the abduction of 276 female students in Nigeria by militant groups are the most recent infamous examples of direct attacks on schools. In addition, there is the risk of armed groups forcibly recruiting children, adolescents and teachers to their cause. The direct consequences of attacks and recruitment can result in lower enrolments due to parents’ reluctance to send children to school or teachers being absent from teaching due to fear of attack. The indirect effects of armed conflict on accessing education are no less severe; forced population displacement and the reduced capacity of the state to deliver education can all adversely affect school attendance, and consequently mean large populations of out of school children and adolescents (Jones and Naylor, 2014a).

Armed conflict can, and often does, mean a diversion of public resources from much needed investment in education towards military spending; between 2010 and 2014, 14 countries were spending more of the government budget on the military spending than they were on education; in all 14 countries the government was spending on education was less than the internationally recommended benchmark of 4-6% of national GDP (SIPRI, 2015 and UNESCO-UIS, 2016). Conflict also leads to increased trauma, fear, and socio-emotional distress for children and adolescents (UNESCO, 2011). It can exacerbate existing inequalities meaning that the most vulnerable populations are the most adversely affected by conflict (UNESCO-UIS, 2010). Gender inequalities during conflict, for instance, tend to increase due to the demands of poverty and labour in the home as well as fear for the safety of girls in schools (UNESCO-UIS, 2010).

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4 Over this 5-year period, the latest year for which data was available was chosen.
Similarly, the aftermath and effects of natural disasters in many of the poorest countries means lower school participation in those areas affected. This is either because parents pull children out of school, or because schooling has been disrupted e.g. due to infrastructural damage or the death of teachers. In low income countries, the numbers affected by natural disasters is overwhelmingly due to drought meaning that communities are forced to abandon their homes; this consequently leads to situations whereby some schools are having to absorb high numbers of children who have become displaced or, as is often the case, the forced displacement means an interrupted education with large numbers of children and young adolescents dropping out of school. The sub-Saharan African continent is affected by drought more than any continent; more than one billion were affected by drought between 1995 and 2015 (CRED and UNISDR, 2015). In Zimbabwe, children born during a drought-affected period are less likely to enrol into school; on average this leads to a loss of 0.4 years of schooling years and a 14% loss of lifetime earnings (UNDP, 2007). Moreover, disasters are more likely to entrench gender disparities further by adversely affecting girls’ education during, or in the aftermath of a disaster. In Pakistan, a study comparing school attendance in eight schools following the devastating effects of the flood in 2010 found that in all cases more girls than boys stayed out of school even when the schools had reopened after the floods; 22% of girls (as compared to 7% of boys) dropped out after the floods making gender disparities even more acute (UNFPA, 2015).

At the Oslo Summit on Education for Development in July 2015, it was estimated that 65 million children aged 3-15 years old (both in and out of school) in 35 countries subject to a humanitarian appeal were directly affected by emergencies and protracted crises (either by conflict, natural disasters, public health disasters or complex crises where the cause is due to a multitude of factors) (Nicolai et al., 2015). This number has since been updated to include for upper secondary aged children, meaning that 75 million children and adolescents were directly affected by crises in 2015. Of the 35 countries with a humanitarian appeal in 2015, 51% were in countries affected by conflict, 17% in countries affected by natural disasters, 23% in countries affected by complex emergencies and 9% in countries affected by a public health disaster (Nicolai et al., 2016). While countries affected by crisis are largely conflict-affected, a large number of countries are also counted as being in complex emergencies – that is the combined effect of man-made and natural disasters, which requires a special response by the international community.

The following paper takes an approach which considers a particular group of children and adolescents whose education has been affected by crisis. The specific focus is on those children and adolescents who are out of school in conflict-affected settings and, within this, establishing whether it is possible to identify those that have had to exit or cut short their schooling specifically because of conflict.
1. **The crucial role of education in countries affected by crises**

The role of education in both mitigating the effects of conflict, and minimising some of the most adverse consequences from natural disaster can be immense. In countries where illiteracy rates are high and where there is a large youth bulge, the chances of being in conflict markedly increases. The role of education in mitigating the likelihood of conflict has been well documented. Doubling the percentage of youth with secondary education from 30% to 60% has the potential to reduce conflict by half (UNESCO, 2014). Its role in promoting tolerance and other global citizenship skills similarly underscores the important contribution education makes for durable peaceful and inclusive societies. While not enough to counter extremism, a good education can at least play a role in helping young people to resist being recruited for extremist causes (Fink et al., 2013).

Education can be a powerful tool in mitigating conflict; the wrong type of education, however, can mean countries are at greater risk of armed conflict. Firstly, where large inequalities exist in being able to access education, for instance, there is an increased risk of conflict. A global study of 100 countries found that one standard deviation in the gini coefficient in the mean years of education was associated with the chances of violent conflict doubling (UNICEF, 2015). Secondly if education is of poor quality, many young people will leave school for the workplace without having acquired the basic skills leading to large grievances. In six countries which have been affected by violence, citizens believe that the poor provision and quality of education have been major drivers of conflict (World Bank, 2011). Lastly, where the classroom is used to ferment hatred and bigotry against minority groups, there is a risk that education will increase the likelihood of armed conflict given its role in reinforcing negative stereotypes (UNESCO, 2011). Therefore, education in itself is not enough to minimise the chances of conflict; rather an inclusive education of good quality free from prejudice is what crucially can mitigate these risks.

Education similarly has a crucial role in building resilience against the longer term effects of natural disasters. The more educated an individual or society is, the better prepared they are in the aftermath of disasters where they suffer lower negative effects and recover faster (Butz et al., 2014). The direct effects of education (cognitive skills, problem-solving skills, better knowledge and risk perception) and indirect effects of education (poverty reduction, access to information and social capital) can all contribute to reducing vulnerability (Butz et al, 2014). One survey of 119 countries determines that, globally, educational attainment is the strongest predictor of climate change awareness (Lee et al., 2015). A strong relationship exists between higher levels of education and lower rates of mortality emanating from disasters; indicators which have the strongest negative correlation with natural disasters are the literacy rate of populations aged 15-24, the literacy rate of the entire population aged 15 or more and gender parity in the literacy ratio (Eriksen et al., 2004). In developing countries, the number of formal years of schooling a population has on average is a greater predictor of losses emanating from disaster compared to income levels (Toya et al., 2007). The World Risk Report similarly recognises the pivotal role that adult literacy, enrolment rates and gender parity in education has in increasing adaptive capacities (UNU-EHS, 2015). The strong evidence of the positive effects of education before the disaster phase, during the disaster event and in the aftermath of disaster all point to a strong case to be made for investment in public education which can reduce vulnerability and enhance adaptive capacities (Butz et al., 2014).
2. **A projected increase in the number of natural disasters**

As of 2016, the likelihood of being displaced by disaster was 60% higher than it was 40 years ago, even when controlling for population growth (UNFPA, 2015). Between 1990 and 2015 the Centre for the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) recorded 9,668 natural disasters worldwide which, on average, affected 217 million people per year during this 25-year period (Guha-Sapir et al., 2016). In 2015, alone there were a reported 344 natural disasters in 113 countries which affected close to 90 million people. The income level of a country appears to affect the death toll from natural disaster. Low and lower middle income countries experienced 46% of disasters, and yet suffered from 71% of deaths; high and upper middle income countries experienced 53% of disasters but lost 29% of lives (Guha-Sapir et al., 2016). The UNHCR has estimated that annually, an average of 26.4 million people worldwide had been displaced by disasters since 2008, with most of this being concentrated within low and lower middle income countries (IDMC, 2015). Of all disasters, extreme climate events such as floods and drought made up 80% of those affected by natural disasters and while the overwhelming numbers affected by natural disasters are from middle income countries, those affected in poorer countries are the ones most at risk of becoming impoverished (Guha-Sapir, 2015). In low income countries, drought affected close to 70% (or 216 million people) of those affected by all natural disasters between 1990 and 2015 (Guha-Sapir et al., 2016).

Natural disasters do not affect all persons equally; it is those with low socioeconomic status, the elderly, children, women and ethnic minorities who tend to be disproportionately affected by disaster events. A wide literature supports that households with resources are better able to mitigate the adverse effects of disaster in relation to their lives, property and livelihoods and therefore, recover quicker when disaster strikes (Butz et al., 2015). Due to the effects of climate change, one study estimates that by 2030, 325 million poor people will be exposed to natural disaster (Shepherd et al., 2013); the report indicates that when removing those countries with good disaster risk management mechanisms in place, 21 countries are likely to have high numbers of those living in poverty and have who are most at risk of natural disaster. The countries most at risk are Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. When just looking at drought, extreme temperature and flood hazards, it is revealed that 319 million extremely poor people will be living in the 45 countries most exposed to these hazards by 2030 (Shepherd et al., 2013). A 2009 World Bank study forecast the countries most at risk from certain disasters. Findings indicate that the majority of countries at risk from drought and agriculture failure are in sub-Saharan Africa; on the other hand, as far as floods and storms go, countries most at risk are situated in South and South East Asia (World Bank, 2009) (Annex 1). Using CRED data from 1975-2014 for both the numbers of disasters and the number of people affected by disasters, this paper projects that the numbers of natural disasters in 2030 is expected to increase to around 650, while the numbers of people affected will reach around 350 million (Figure 1).
Figure 1: The number of natural disasters and those affected has been increasing and is projected to increase between now and 2030

*Number of natural disasters and numbers affected, 1970-2030*

- **Source:** Authors’ calculations based on the EM-DAT CRED database, accessed February 2016.
- **Notes:** Forward looking forecasts have been based on the actual numbers of natural disasters and those affected over the period 1970-2015. It has smoothed out the data using a three-year rolling average.

A world-wide trend is that natural disasters are increasing in severity and becoming increasingly costly in economic terms. Between now and 2025, the cost of the damage from windstorms has been estimated at US$587 billion; the equivalent for earthquakes, floods and drought are US$465 billion, $89 billion, $89 billion, and $89 billion respectively (University of Cambridge, 2015). A recent World Bank report illustrates that the economic and humanitarian effects of rising global temperatures will be concentrated in low and middle income, and small-island countries. Specifically, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, where 90% of food and fodder is produced through rain-fed agriculture and where more than 70% of the population’s livelihoods depend on agriculture, the situation is particularly worrisome. Over the last 50 years the frequency of droughts has been increasing in East Africa, while decreasing in West Africa. While drought accounted for only 4% of all natural disasters globally over 2000-2015, they accounted for 8% of all natural disasters in sub-Saharan Africa and of all occurrence of drought, 38% were situated in sub-Saharan Africa (Guha-Sapir et al., 2016).
3. Projecting the number of countries in armed conflict

Since the 1950s there has been a steady decline in conflict-related deaths; even when taking into account the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is estimated that there has been a 90% fall in conflict-related deaths (Wilton Park, 2011). While the long-term trend in armed conflict has been declining since the end of the Cold War, in recent years there has been an upward surge in both the number and the severity of armed conflict. In 2014, the number of armed conflicts in the world totalled 40 with the numbers of people killed as a direct consequence of conflict surpassing 100,000 making this the highest death toll in over 25 years: Syria accounted for over half of all deaths. Of the 40 conflicts, 11 accounted for more than 90% of all deaths; six of these 11 conflicts were “protracted” in nature. However, when looking at it from the number of deaths per million, the trend points to a general decline in battle related deaths (Gates et al., 2016).

Increasingly conflict and accompanying fatalities are due to internal conflict as oppose to conflict between states. Of all the conflicts this century, 90% are in those countries which had already experienced a civil war. A large body of evidence indicates that internal armed conflicts are most likely to be prevalent in large countries which are have a large proportion of poor, illiterate populations or youth bulges in the population; one forecasting study also finds that the incidence of armed conflict is likely to increase in a country if it has experienced conflict in past years, or with neighbouring countries (Hegre, 2014).

One body of research projects how armed conflict is likely to decrease between now and 2030. The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) predicts that globally the total number of countries world-wide in armed conflict (either minor or major) will decline from 14% in 2015 to 10% in 2030 to 6% in 2050, with conflict increasingly being concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Hegre et al. 2014). Between now and 2030 and beyond, PRIO projections assume that conflict will increasingly be concentrated in poorer countries with large populations. In 2030, it is predicted that 16 countries will be in armed conflict; there is a projected decline in the numbers of countries which are predicted to be in conflict from 23 in 2015 and 22 in 2020 (Figure 2). Some countries are projected to remain at risk of being in conflict for every year between now and 2030; for instance, the probability of Ethiopia being in conflict remains at ~80%. In other countries, the probability of being in conflict decreases over the time frame considered; in Yemen, for instance, the probability of being in major or minor conflict in 2015 was 79% but by 2030 this is expected to fall below 50%. Finally, in the case of very few countries the probability of being in conflict increases; Bangladesh, for instance, does not appear on the list of conflict-affected countries predicted to be in conflict in 2015 but by 2030 it has a 56% chance of being in conflict, either minor or major. See Annex 2 and Annex 3 for a list of countries forecast to be affected by minor or major conflict between now and 2050.

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5 This estimate is prior to the start of the Syria conflict.
6 A minor conflict is defined as that where there are between 25 and 999 deaths per year, while a major conflict is defined as more than 1,000 deaths per year as a result of internal conflict.
7 The paper takes the definition here that a country is in armed conflict if the probability of being in either minor or major conflict exceeds 50%.
Figure 2: The number of countries predicted to be in major or minor armed conflict will decrease between 2015 and 2030 and increasingly be concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia

*Projected number of countries in armed conflict for given year, 2015-2050*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>South Asia</th>
<th>East Asia and the Pacific</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
<th>Europe and Central Asia</th>
<th>Latin America and the Caribbean</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2030</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hegre et al. (2016).

Notes: A country projected to be in either minor or major conflict has been defined in this paper as any country where the probability is 50% or more in a given year.

While Figure 2 has presented the numbers of countries where the probability of being in either major or minor armed conflict *in any given year* exceeds 50%, the reality is that the impacts of conflict continue long after conflict has ended. This is supported by evidence that crises of late are becoming extremely protracted in nature (World Bank, 2011). Returning to a state of normalcy can take many years even when conflict between different armed factions has officially ended. Displaced persons in Europe after World War 2, for instance, were finally resettled some 20 years after conflict had ceased. One survey of 60 countries with a large internally displaced population, found that in 90% of countries the displacement had been ongoing for ten years or more (IDMC, 2015). Similarly, as far as refugees are concerned, they continue to spend longer in exile; one estimate is that the length of stay in exile is close to 20 years (Betts et al., 2014).

With this in mind it is useful to make the distinction between countries in armed conflict in any one year versus conflict-affected countries. The definition of the latter would include countries – in a given year – where conflict may have ceased but which factor in a period for returning to normalcy. Where a country is in major conflict, with the number of deaths exceeding 1,000 people in any given year, the methodology of this paper has assumed the country would remain conflict-affected for 10 years thereafter even when the conflict has ceased. In the scenario where this relates to a minor conflict (between 25 and 999 deaths) the equivalent period taken has been one of 3 years.

Figure 3 provides an alternative picture based on historical and projected numbers of countries which are conflict-affected. Taking the last 14 years as a time reference, there was a decline in the number of conflict-affected countries until 2010 before this increased slightly because of regional conflict in the Middle East and North Africa region, namely in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The
The number of conflict-affected countries in 2014 numbered 30 of which 11 (37%) were in sub-Saharan Africa, 7 (23%) were in the Middle East and North Africa, 5 (17%) were in South Asia and the remainder – 7 (23%) were in Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean. Of the 30 countries defined as conflict-affected, 18 have been in conflict for the entire 15-year period considered; 11 of these countries are in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Afghanistan, Chad, D. R. Congo, Ethiopia, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda) which as the previous section indicated are also the regions where contract is projected to be increasingly concentrated.

**Figure 3:** The numbers of countries affected by conflict is expected to decline from 2015 onwards, despite the increase in recent years

*Past and projected number of countries affected by conflict, 2000-2030*

Source: Hegre et al. (2016) and UCDP (2016).

Notes: (1) For the numbers of countries classed as conflict-affected between 2000 and 2014 the definition used by the *Global Monitoring Report* has been used. This draws on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Database and defines a conflict-affected country as one where there have been 1,000 or more battle-related deaths over a 10-year period plus any country that has experienced 200 or more battle-related deaths in any one year over the last 3 years. This paper has utilised a similar method using the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) data which projects the likelihood of a country being in either minor conflict (25-999 battle related deaths) or major conflict (1,000+ battle related deaths). It has firstly identified all countries predicted to be in either minor or major conflict using a cut-off of probability point of 50%. It has then for each year divided the number of countries likely to be in either minor or major conflict. A conflict-affected country, for any given year, is defined as one has been predicted to be in major conflict over the preceding 10 year period plus any country that has is predicted to experience 25 or more battle-related death in any one year over the past 3 years. The definitional cut-off point of being in minor conflict of 25 or more deaths is less than that used by the *Global Monitoring Report* of 200 deaths and is one reason for the slight jump in the number of conflict-affected between 2014 and 2015. (2) The graph has only presented 5 year periods forecasting the number of countries in conflict between 2015 and 2030. If it were to include all years then decline in the number in conflict-affected countries would be more gradual.
Based on PRIO projections of the numbers of countries affected by conflict between now and 2030, this report has tried to identify the absolute numbers of children and adolescent aged children in these countries. In 2015, the share of global primary and lower secondary aged children in conflict-affected countries was estimated at 18%; while the number of countries defined as conflict-affected almost halving by 2030 (Table 1), the share of children and adolescents in conflict-affected countries has been calculated as falling to 13%. Despite the numbers of conflict-affected countries becoming more concentrated in fewer countries, the share of primary and lower secondary aged children in conflict-affected countries will fall by a much lower rate, largely because conflict being concentrated in large populous countries.

Table 1: Numbers and share of primary and lower secondary aged children in countries projected to be conflict-affected countries between 2015 and 2030

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<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Secondary aged</td>
<td>124.5m</td>
<td>122.2m</td>
<td>111.0m</td>
<td>112.5m</td>
<td>114.6m</td>
<td>115.7m</td>
<td>111.5m</td>
<td>97.4m</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of global school aged population</td>
<td>104.3m</td>
<td>100.3m</td>
<td>95.2m</td>
<td>93.8m</td>
<td>95.8m</td>
<td>97.1m</td>
<td>97.3m</td>
<td>82.9m</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Hegre et al. (2016), UCDP (2016), World Bank (2016).

Notes: For certain countries defined as conflict-affected in any given year, the figures presented in the table assume a subset of primary and lower secondary aged children based on sub-regions affected by conflict. These countries include Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Philippines.

While the above has presented a scenario where conflict is increasingly concentrated and the projected numbers affected will decrease, another body of literature is less optimistic and forecasts that there will be an increased risk of conflict between now and 2030. Factors which increase this risk involve a more volatile global economy, greater natural resource constraints relating to land and water and environmental degradation. The more recent high-profile natural disasters in fragile contexts illustrate there is a causal link between disaster and conflict which is reinforced by fragility. As Section 2 of this paper set out, the projected numbers of natural disasters between now and 2030 is set to increase. The overwhelming evidence available indicates that natural disasters are more likely to exacerbate pre-existing conflicts (Harris et al., 2013). Between 2005 and 2009, 50% of those affected by natural disaster were living in fragile and conflict-affected countries (Kellett and Sparks, 2013).8

The pressures of rapid urbanization in much of the developing regions indicate that over the next 40 years almost the entire increase in the global population will be concentrated in coastal cities. A 2011 Asian Development Bank study predicts that with climate change being the main driver of migration in the 21st century, millions of people from rural areas across the Asia-Pacific region will migrate to cities over the coming decades (Gemenne et al., 2011). The Asia-Pacific region, which is home to four billion people, has some of the fastest growing cities in the world: by 2020 it is projected that of the 25 megacities worldwide, 13 will be situated in the Asia-Pacific region (ADB, 2011). With rapid urbanization, economic and governance challenges are amplified by rapid population growth: in geographic locations not prepared for the strain on existing infrastructure, the risk for future conflict are magnified with people fighting for scarcer resources in under-serviced and

8 While the discussion has focused on the causality between natural disaster and the vulnerability to conflict, a large array of literature also considers what the impact of conflict is on increasing the likelihood of natural disasters.
under-governed urban areas (Kilcullen, 2012). Between 2006 and 2011, for instance, the North East region in Syria was hit by long-term drought with one million rural villagers losing their farms due to total crop failure. With their loss of livelihoods, many families migrated to already overcrowded cities leading to growing unrest and this is cited as one of the many complex factors leading to civil war (Mitra and Vivekananda, 2013).

While past trends indicate that there has been a decline in the numbers of countries in conflict globally since the end of the Cold War, what the literature indicates is mixed. On the one hand, simulations project that the numbers of countries in conflict are set to decline between now and 2050 with these being increasingly concentrated in fewer countries. However, on the other hand with the increase in tensions over increasingly scarce resources and the adverse effects of climate change, another body of literature predicts that this greater vulnerability is likely to lead to increased conflict.
4. Children and adolescents out of school in countries affected by conflict

4.1 An overview of children and adolescents out of school countries affected by conflict

In times of violent conflict, the lives of children and adolescents are deeply affected and their education is often disrupted. Children living in conflict-affected countries, internally displaced children (IDPs), refugee children and children in areas hosting refugees all bear the burden of violent conflict. In spite of much progress of increasing access for primary education, progress in recent years has stalled with the latest figures from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) at the time of writing this report, estimating that 34 million children and adolescents were out of school in 2012.

The UIS estimates that as of school year ending 2012 there were 21 million out of school children and 13 million out of school adolescents⁹ in those countries defined as conflict-affected.¹⁰ Together these children and adolescents made up 28% of the global out of school and out-of-adolescent population which totalled 121 million. The proportion of children out of school has, over time, become more concentrated in those countries affected by conflict. While in 1999 the total number of out of school primary aged children the share living in conflict was 30%, this had increased to 36% by 2012. Within the Arab States region, the share rose from 63% in 1999 to 87% in 2012, while in South Asia it doubled from 21% to 42% (UNESCO, 2015a) (Figure 4).¹¹

Figure 4: Out of school children and adolescents in conflict-affected countries are overwhelmingly concentrated in low and lower middle income countries and within the sub-Saharan African region

Share of out of school children and adolescents in conflict-affected countries, 2012

A. By income grouping

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⁹ These refer to adolescents of lower secondary school age
¹⁰ The countries referred to as conflict-affected takes the definition employed by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report which is based on the numbers of battle-related deaths over a set period of time. These countries differ from that of the list of countries defined as crisis affected by the ODI paper feeding into the Education Crisis Platform launched in May 2016. The ODI analysis is based on the countries for which there was a UNICEF Humanitarian Action Appeal for Children in 2015.
B. By regional grouping

![Graph showing regional grouping of forced displacement]

Source: UNESCO (2015a)

4.2 Armed conflict and its impact on forced migration

Armed conflict means that persons affected by conflict are often forced to leave their homes to escape its affects; one study of eight conflict-affected countries estimated that over half of those living in conflict-affected areas had been displaced and either moved to other parts of the country, or neighbouring countries (ICRC, 2009). As of 2014, an estimated 60 million people (refugees and internally displaced persons) had been forcibly displaced from their homes as a consequence of armed conflict and persecution; this is the highest number since records began. As of mid-2015, the numbers of forcibly displaced persons were estimated to surpass that of 2014 (UNHCR, 2015b). As far as schooling goes, while accessing school in conflict settings remains poor, the situation is worsened by displacement of children and adolescents to areas where they do not have access to education (Jones and Naylor, 2014a).

The latest UNHCR statistics on the total number of refugees under the UNHCR mandate indicate that the numbers fleeing disasters is at a record high, totalling 15.1 million as of mid-2015 (UNHCR, 2016a). The global refugee population has increased by 45% over the last 3½ years, largely as a consequence of the civil war in Syria (GMDAC, 2015). In 2014, the UNHCR estimated that of the total refugee population of 14.4 million, 5.3 million were of primary and secondary school aged (UNHCR, 2015b). Refugees remain five times more likely to be out of primary school compared to their non-refugee counterparts. Globally it was estimated that just one in two refugee children were attending primary school, while just one in four were attending secondary school (UNHCR, 2016b). In 2014 this meant that there were 3.2 million children and adolescents who were refugees that were out of school (Figure 3).

Similarly, the global numbers of IDPs in their own countries due to violence and armed conflict has rapidly grown in recent years. As of the end of 2014, 38 million people around the world had been

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11 Statistics on refugees presented here are those which under UNHCR. They do not include for Palestinian refugees who are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). When including for refugees registered with UNRWA, the total global number of refugees at the end of 2014 totalled 19.5 million.
displaced from their homes and communities; this represented a 15% increase compared to numbers of IDPs in 2013 and was the highest number recorded in over a decade. The majority of the increase in the numbers of IDPs was due to protracted crises in Iraq, South Sudan, Syria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria; these countries accounted for 60% of the globally numbers who were newly displaced. Currently Syria accounts for one-fifth of the total global IDP population. As with refugees, the number of years that IDPs can be displaced is high; 90% of the 60 countries monitored reported that IDPs had been displaced, on average, for ten years and more. Despite the global numbers of IDPs being twice that of refugees, the profile of IDPs continues to be extremely poor; data disaggregated by age and by gender, for instance, was only available for 17 of the 60 countries where data was collected from in 2014 (IDMC, 2015). One estimate is that roughly half of all IDPs are under the age of 18 (UNESCO, 2011).

**Education statistics on refugees and IDPs are notoriously complex, meaning often focusing on education indicators for this sub-group prove difficult to estimate** (Dryden-Peterson, 2011b). The global numbers on out of school children and adolescents, for instance, can be subject to both over-estimation and under-estimation when taking into account these sub-groups of conflict-affected persons. In the case of under-estimation, for instance, refugees may not be included in the overall out of school figures (in either the country of origin from which the refugees are from or the refugee hosting country itself). Similarly, it remains challenging to track IDP children who have moved due to conflict; therefore they may not be included in total numbers out of school (Dryden-Peterson, 2011b). On the other hand the impact of these populations on out of school numbers can lead to over-estimates, when included, if school participation rates of refugee populations are lower in the host country when these populations are accounted for (Jones and Naylor, 2014a).

**Figure 5: Numbers of primary and secondary aged children who are refugees or in “refugee-like” situations has been increasing**

*Numbers and shares of primary and secondary aged children in refugee populations, 2011-2014*

Source: Authors calculations based on UNHCR Statistical Yearbooks, various years

Notes: The UNHCR and UIS-UNESCO calculated that in 2014 one in two primary school aged children and one in four secondary school aged adolescents amongst refugees was out of school. This graph has applied these proportions for previous years (2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013).
4.3 Estimating the numbers of children and adolescents who exit their schooling because of conflict: the challenges

The 2011 Education for All Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO, 2011) and the Global Out-of-School Initiative (UNESCO and UNICEF, 2015) have done an extensive amount of work on monitoring the numbers of children out of school over time and, how, this particular sub-category of children is becoming more and more concentrated in countries defined as conflict-affected. This work has consistently illuminated that out of school children are disproportionately situated in conflict-affected countries as compared to their share of primary and secondary aged children and adolescents worldwide. With the SDGs looking beyond primary, the focus of out of school adolescents is also becoming increasingly important. In conflict and post-conflict settings youth have many pressing needs, including the development of appropriate skills for the labour-force and life skills, for which secondary schooling is vital (Dryden-Peterson, 2011a).

Armed conflict has been linked to serious challenges for the education of children and adolescents. Children who live in conflict-affected countries, IDPs, refugee children, and children in areas hosting refugees all bear the burden of violent conflict (Dryden-Peterson, 2011a). While the data tells us about the scale of the challenge concerning children and adolescents being able to access education in conflict-affected countries, it is less clear in distinguishing between those children and adolescents in conflict-affected countries who would have been out of school irrespective of conflict and those whose schooling has been directly or indirectly affected as a consequence of the conflict.

Correlations have been drawn between armed conflict and loss of years of education. The 2011 Education for All Global Monitoring Report published a set of education statistics of countries affected by armed conflict: these show that conflict-affected countries have lower gross enrolment ratios (for primary and secondary), lower youth literacy rates, and more gender inequality in education (UNESCO, 2011). The report also highlighted the correlation between war and loss of years of education by calculating pre-conflict growth trends for years in school before the conflict and contrasting it with the growth rate during the conflict (EFA GMR, 2011). Based on the analysis of trends before and during conflicts in seven countries, the presence of conflict was shown to have led to a loss of 1.4 to 5.5 years of schooling (UNESCO, 2011). The greatest losses in years of education were in Afghanistan during the 1978-2001 conflict, with an estimated 5.5 years of schooling lost, and the 1977-1992 Mozambique conflict, with an estimated 5.3 years of schooling lost (UNESCO, 2011). This evidence points to the serious harm that many years of protracted conflict can inflict upon education attainment.

Some studies have presented compelling evidence of the link between conflict and school enrolment. Based on a regression analysis one global study, for instance, found that an increase of approximately 1,000 battle related deaths resulted in primary enrolment decreasing by between 1.4% and 3.4% when controlling for population growth; put another way, for the average conflict-affected country, the study finds that the effect of conflict resulted in a decline of enrolment of 64,000 (Lai and Thyne, 2007). Others have provided more mixed evidence. An analysis of 19 conflict-affected found that while there was evidence of a negative relationship between conflict and education, the results were statistically insignificant. The poor data availability and the fact that the data used was national – rather than sub-national – was cited as a reason for the weak relationship, meaning that while a negative correlation between conflict and school participation in conflict-
affected countries could not be ruled out, further work is required to support the correlation (EPDC, 2010).

In the case of most of the countries defined as conflict-affected, it is clear that enrolment levels were low as far as primary and secondary schooling attendance were concerned even before the conflict. Circumstances predating conflict in many countries meant that children may never have had the opportunity to attend school due to under-investment, inequitable investment and/or ineffective investment in education (Jones and Naylor, 2014a). One study – which tries to determine the effect of armed conflict on education before, during, and after conflict for 25 countries – found that armed conflict led to lower levels of educational attainment and that the proportion of the population with formal schooling and literacy rates was low. However, given that the study was limited to observational data, the causal link between conflict and loss of education could not be conclusively given (UNESCO-UIS, 2010).

A more useful comparison is where conflict is restricted to a sub-region of the country and comparisons with non-conflict-affected regions. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, it was found that the rate of out of school children was only 7% higher than the national average for the four provinces affected by conflict (OOSCI, 2013). Similarly, in the case of Pakistan, differences in primary enrolment between conflict and non-conflict areas were found to be statistically insignificant; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the province most affected by conflict between 2001 and 2011, had similar primary enrolment rates in 2011 to that of the Sindh province which has been relatively unaffected by conflict (Jones and Naylor, 2014b). However, while there did not seem to be conclusive evidence of a relationship between conflict and education in the case of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, further analysis done showed that if disaggregated to district level where the conflict was localised, a more statistically significant relationship was apparent (EPDC, 2010).

While the above has presented literature presenting some of the challenges in identifying which out of school children are out of school because of armed conflict, there are some examples whereby the effect of conflict on accessing schooling is clear. In Syria findings appear to strongly corroborate that the numbers of out of school children and adolescents are almost solely due to the devastating impact that five years of civil war has had on schooling systems (UNICEF, 2016a).

4.3.1 Estimating the numbers of children and adolescents who exit their schooling because of conflict: case studies

When considering the numbers of out of school children and adolescent across the 30 conflict-affected countries identified for this report, a striking observation is the vast range in the rates of out of school children between different conflict-affect countries; as far as primary education is concerned, for instance, out of school rates ranged from 1% in Algeria to 74% in Afghanistan (Annex 4).

Turning to the approaches, more specifically, to quantify the numbers of children whose conflict is affected by conflict has considered various methodologies two of which we summarize. One approach has been to determine with more precision the numbers of out of school children and adolescents in regions of a country where conflict is situated, given that in many countries conflict is highly localised to a particular region. The Global Monitoring Report (GMR) has utilised a partial sub-national approach when determining the numbers of out of school children and adolescents in populous conflict-affected countries. In 2011, GMR calculated out of school children at the sub-
national level in regions defined as conflict-affected in four large countries: India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan (UNESCO, 2011). Using this approach and going a step further, one study in 2012 applied this sub-national methodology to all conflict-affected countries defined by the GMR, and found that out of school children living in conflict-affected areas based on sub-national estimates numbered 11 million (cf. 39 million when estimating the number of out of school children in all conflict-affected countries) (Jones and Naylor, 2014a). This paper has provided an update on this methodology and found that for 15 conflict-affected countries in 2013, 34% of out-of-school children in these 15 countries were living in those sub-regions of the country affected by conflict (Annex 5).

However, the sub-national approach still fails to accurately pinpoint the numbers of children and adolescents out of school because of conflict. As the beginning of this section documented, the studies carried out to answer this have found results which are often inconclusive. The lack of reliable, longitudinal dataset with enrolments sufficiently disaggregated by sub-regions of the country has been cited as a major obstacle in regression analyses providing more robust findings (Jones and Naylor, 2014a). A study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Pakistan – three countries with some of the largest numbers of out of school children – found that in 2011 anywhere between 5 to 20% of the total number of out of school children in these three countries was directly attributable to conflict (Table 2). The range varies significantly both between and within countries. In Nigeria, for instance, the study finds that less than 5% of the total numbers of out of school children are out of school because of conflict. This is significantly less than, say, Pakistan where the range is anywhere from as low as 15% to as high as 50%. As the authors’ of these studies themselves acknowledge these wide ranges in country are due to methodological constraints which cannot confirm a robust causal link between conflict and children being out of school (Jones and Naylor, 2014a).

Table 2: Estimated numbers of OOSC in three conflict-affected countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated no. of OOSC (UIS definition) 2011</th>
<th>Approx. proportion of OOSC that can be attributed to conflict, based on case studies</th>
<th>Approx. no. of OOSC in 2011 due to conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>3.5 million</td>
<td>10-20%</td>
<td>0.3-0.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>10.5 million</td>
<td>&lt;5%</td>
<td>&lt;0.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5.4 million</td>
<td>15-50%</td>
<td>0.8-2.7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>19.4 million</td>
<td>5-20% (of total)</td>
<td>1.1-3.9 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Jones and Naylor, 2014a)

An important distinction must be drawn where there is a sudden outbreak of conflict and that of where a country has been in protracted conflict. In the case of the former, where a country goes from sudden onset conflict in a short space of time, it is much easier to isolate the impact of conflict on education systems. The following section considers the impact of conflict on accessing education in two very different conflict-affected contexts, Mali and Syria.

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Syrian Arab Republic: When a country erupts into sudden conflict after a period of relative stability, the impact of conflict on children and adolescents’ education becomes evident. As of 2015, half of Syria’s population had been displaced from their homes by the civil war (RAND, 2015). In total, an estimated 8.4 million children have been affected by the crisis and are presently in need, within Syria and outside of the country (UNICEF, 2016a). An additional 2.4 million children have been displaced and are registered or awaiting registration as refugees outside of Syria (UNICEF, 2016a). The number of child refugees is growing very rapidly—the total has increased exponentially over the past three years, from approximately 520,000 in 2013 to 2.4 million in 2016 (UNICEF, 2016a).

The conflict has reversed two decades of progress in education progress in Syria, which had achieved near-universal primary education enrolment and literacy rates of over 90% before the war began (UNICEF, 2015b; Save the Children, 2014). Prior to the conflict, the numbers of children out of school were negligible; five years after conflict commenced, there are an estimated 2.1 million out of school children inside Syria and 0.7 million out of school Syrian children in neighbouring countries (UNICEF, 2016a). The conflict moreover has not only impacted those children and adolescents who have dropped out of the education system, but also those that remain in it and who have managed to continue their education, either through formal schooling or non-formal education.

The substantial numbers of children and adolescents out of school has been attributed to a number of reasons. As of 2015, it was estimated that one in four schools had been closed due to infrastructural damage or demand for temporary shelter for displaced families (UNICEF, 2015a). Some schools continue to attempt to hold classes, but the system faces severe challenges. Over 52,500 teachers (approximately 22%) and 523 of school counsellors (18%) have left the education system, which has led to overcrowded classrooms and a larger share of unqualified teachers (UNICEF, 2016b). Moreover, for the millions of Syrian families that have been displaced, enrolling children in school can be challenging if they lack proper documentation (UNICEF, 2015a).

In 2015, in the five main host countries of Syrian refugees (Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt), 658,000 children accessed formal education, along with 155,000 in non-formal education programs (3RP, 2016). However, due to the continued flow of refugees out of Syria and into the host nations, about half of refugee children remained out of school (3RP, 2016).

A report published by RAND in 2015 illustrated the barriers facing Syrian children to enrolling and staying in school in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The 2015 enrolment figures for Syrian primary students in these three countries are presented in Figure 6. In Lebanon, where the largest numbers of primary-aged refugee children are situated, close to 75% are out of school; the equivalent for Jordan and Turkey is around 42% (RAND, 2015). Host education systems strain to accommodate the influx of refugee children; in the case of Lebanon, the 400,000 Syrian children who needed access to education in 2015 now far outnumber Lebanese children in terms of demand for public education, as just 30% of Lebanese children (approximately 270,000) attend public schools (RAND, 2015). Some of major barriers to enrolment for Syrian children include financial barriers, safety concerns, prevalence of child labour and child marriage, lack of documentation, and lack of institutional capacity, i.e. shortage of teachers or classroom space (UNICEF, 2016b).
While efforts have been made to mitigate some of these challenges, Syrian refugee children need more support to ensure that they can continue their education and prepare for their futures. The number of Syrian children and adolescents out of school due to conflict now exceeds 2 million; Figure 7 presents the latest estimates of Syrian out of school children and adolescents. The No Lost Generation initiative has called upon donors and governments to invest in educational interventions and safeguard the futures of Syrian children (3RP, 2016). Annex 6 provides a brief overview of current educational interventions for Syrian children and adolescents within Syria and in host countries.
Mali: In an already fragile educational environment, conflict exacerbates the challenges that children face in accessing education. Before conflict in Mali commenced in 2012, children faced barriers to accessing education, including weak infrastructure, cost of education, and parental reluctance to send children to school (IMF, 2013). The conflict simply aggravated those barriers creating new challenges, in its wake, particularly for girls (Plan Ireland).

For example, pre-conflict, Mali already faced a shortage of qualified teachers; the average student-teacher ratio in public schools was 1 to 48 (UIS, 2011). Post-conflict, the teacher shortage has worsened and has left 80% of teachers in the Northern region of Mali, the area most affected by the conflict, internally displaced or fleeing to neighbouring countries, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania (Plan Ireland). As of 2013, approximately 2,500 schools needed to be reconstructed due to the direct effects of conflict; the school system required an additional 12,500 teachers to be able to teach in emergencies, to fill the schools (IMF, 2013).

Similarly, as far as out of school children goes prior to the conflict starting the education system had been beset with many challenges with 1.2 million children out of school even before the conflict began (IMF, 2013). The conflict has impacted the education of an estimated 800,000 children, some who have remained in school and some who have been forced to drop out (IMF, 2013). Based on household surveys, it is estimated that 51% of Malian children may never enrol in primary school (UNICEF, 2014). However, distinguishing the number of children who have dropped out, or will never enrol, as a direct result of the conflict is extremely difficult when many barriers existed already pre-conflict.

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13 The estimated in Figure 7 reflect out of school children and adolescents age 5-17, of primary and secondary age. Given the current instability in Syria and difficulty of tracking IDPs and refugees, the estimates of out of school children and adolescents have varied during the course of the conflict and across sources. The numbers in this figure were drawn from the latest estimates from UNICEF’s 2016 report.
The effect of conflict on the rates of enrolment can be considered vis-à-vis projections of what the rates of enrolment would have been if following pre-conflict trends and projections based on current trends. The Education Policy and Data Centre (EPDC) in 2012, through the use of statistical modelling, projected that Mali would reach 100% gross enrolment rates for both girls and boys by 2021 (EPDC, 2013a; EPDC, 2013b). The outbreak of conflict in 2012, however, clearly shows the disruption in the previous upward trends in the rates of enrolment at primary level. The subsequent figure depicts Mali’s current trends, using UIS data. Despite gross enrolment ratios in Mali being low pre-conflict compared to the global average, the decade before the conflict had seen the country make steady progress toward greater enrolment for both boys and girls. However, after the conflict began in early 2012, there is an observable sharp decline in enrolment.

**Figure 8: Mali Primary Enrolment Trends, 2004-2014**

![Mali Primary Enrolment Trends](image)

*Source: UIS Data Centre Educational Statistics*

Much literature relating to the effects of armed conflict on education has assumed a negative correlation between armed conflict and the adverse impact on education, whether this be in relation to access or quality issues. The evidence of a large share of the global out of school population being increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected countries, and that conflict-affected countries remain the most off track to reaching the Education for All (EFA) goals set by the international community, makes a compelling case for the unidirectional and negative effect of conflict on education (UNESCO, 2015b).

And yet many studies, as have been documented in this paper, have failed to separate out the quantitative effects of violent and armed conflict on the numbers of out of school children and adolescents; this, in part, is attributable, to the poor state of timely and disaggregated data. Beyond the challenge of poor data being able to confidently identify those children and adolescents who are out of school *because* of conflict, some critics in the education community have raised questions on the mainstream narrative regarding conflict’s impact on education. The 2012 Human Security Report, for instance, cites that where the evidence of conflict’s effects on education provides the
strongest evidence of a negative correlation, it is in the case of the most extreme cases of violent and armed conflict; this, the Report argued, is unrepresentative of conflict-affected countries as a whole. The Report instead sought to understand the effect on education through the lens of state fragility (Human Security Report, 2012).

A more recent study finds that while there is clear evidence that armed conflict is associated with lower and declining rates of enrolment rates, once state fragility is controlled for the relationship between conflict and education is not statistically significant. Given the premise that fragility is a cause of both conflict and decreased educational attainment, the findings would appear to suggest that the education community needs to look beyond the parameters of violent conflict when assessing variables influencing educational access in conflict-affected countries (Shields and Paulson, 2015). This would also, by extension, need to consider the primary causes of armed conflict to shed further light on the challenges in ensuring that all children and adolescents are in school. Better evidence, therefore, of the somewhat complex relationship between fragility, conflict and education could lead to a better understanding of the reasons for out of school children and adolescents in conflict-affected countries and more robust figures to support the findings.
Conclusion

The numbers of out of school children and adolescents in regions of conflict presents the very grim reality that reaching even the Education for All (EFA) goals, let alone the more ambitious SDG agenda, seems unlikely to materialise without concerted action. As of 2012, 34 million children and adolescents of primary and lower secondary age remain out of school in conflict-affected countries – or 36% of the global out of school numbers. As this paper has illustrated in spite of one body of thought forecasting projected numbers of countries in armed conflict declining between now and 2030, it takes many years for countries to return to a state of normalcy with communities remaining displaced long after conflict has ceased. Coupled with this is the other body of literature projecting an increase in conflict due to the effects of natural disaster, hence making it even more crucial that stakeholders focus on this sub-set of countries without which the SDGs will be off-track.

The paper, drawing on current literature on this area, has tried to estimate what percentage of those children and adolescents that are out of school have had their education disrupted directly due to the conflict. The answer is that this is highly context-dependent. The sudden onset of conflict in Syria, for instance, is estimated to account for 100% of children currently out of school; prior to the conflict the country had attained universal enrolment. On the other hand, in a situation of protracted crisis as is the case in Nigeria, it has been estimated that less than 5% of children who are out of school lost their schooling due to conflict. To arrive at a global estimate of the numbers of children out of school because of conflict given the enormous range involved (from 5% to 100%) presents a challenge which needs to be addressed going forward.

The reasons for being able to confidently estimate the total number of children and adolescents out of school as a direct consequence of conflict are a starting point from which key recommendations can be made going forward.

The first limitation relates to the scarcity of reliable and timely data for education in conflict-affected countries. While, at the global level, data on education has significantly improved in recent years including for conflict-affected countries the absence of timely statistics for some conflict-affected states remains problematic. Therefore, improving policy-makers understanding of the estimated impact of conflict on education will likely mean increased investment in the capacity to collect more timely and accurate data at the country level for those countries in crisis.

The second limitation has been that much of the current analysis that has been done at the level of the nation-state. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, given that conflict is often situated in particular geographical ‘hotspots’ within a country – particularly in populous countries – sub-national, rather than national, data is more accurate. Some of the conclusions have been that were more evaluations done at the district level in countries where conflict is localised then a more robust relationship would be apparent. A further problematic aspect of using the nation-state as the unit of analysis has been that it does not consider the indirect impact of neighbouring countries to those in conflict. While these countries may not be defined as conflict-affected, their education systems are still affected. Conducting analysis only at nation-level, therefore could lead to failing to quantify serious impacts of conflict on education in countries not labelled conflict-affected. Therefore, in addition to the immediate need of basic data on education indicators for conflict-affected countries, the agenda going forward must also consider the need of gathering more sub-national data, particularly in contexts where conflict is localised.
A third limitation has been attaining good, robust and timely education statistics for children and adolescents who are categorised as refugees and IDPs. The global numbers estimate that there were approximately 60 million people who were either refugees or IDPs in 2014 – higher than any time-period post World War 2. The risk of either under-estimating or over-estimating the numbers of children and adolescents out of school as a consequence of forced displacement to escape armed conflict presents a severe challenge to better understanding of the magnitude of how conflict affects school enrolments. A greater focus on improving the education statistics of refugees and IDPs, therefore, is imperative going forward. Global institutions such as the UNHCR and UNESCO-UIS must lead these efforts on collection education indicators specifically for refugees and IDP, with an emphasis on disaggregation by gender and by age.

In summary, there can be no doubt that the effects of armed conflict have had devastating effects on the schooling of children and adolescents. And yet, as this paper has sought to do, trying to quantify those children and adolescents whose schooling has been interrupted directly as a result of conflict has been challenging given the constraints as far as reliable, timely and disaggregated education statistics go. An emerging strand of literature when considering the impact of conflict on education, has been to understand this in the context of fragility. Given that fragility is a cause of both conflict and decreased educational attainment, a recommendation going forward is for the education community to invest more resources into evaluations which look beyond the parameters of violent conflict and consider the effects of fragility in determining the numbers of out of school children and adolescents in conflict-affected countries.
Annexes

Annex 1: Countries most at risk of natural disaster by type

Annex 2: Countries where the likelihood of being in major or minor conflict exceeds 50%, various years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2035</th>
<th>2040</th>
<th>2045</th>
<th>2050</th>
<th>2021-2030</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>(86%)</td>
<td>Colombia (76%)</td>
<td>Colombia (70%)</td>
<td>Colombia (66%)</td>
<td>Colombia (63%)</td>
<td>Colombia (59%)</td>
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<td>Colombia (55%)</td>
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<td>D. R. Congo (53%)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Uganda (78%)</td>
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<td>Algeria (59%)</td>
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<td>Afghanistan (68%)</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>India (81%)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Afghaistan (76%)</td>
<td>Philippines (61%)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>India (84%)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Pakistan (80%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>(91%)</td>
<td>Myanmar (68%)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>(80%)</td>
<td>Philippines (69%)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>(81%)</td>
<td>Thailand (58%)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>(75%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 countries | 22 countries | 17 countries | 16 countries | 15 countries | 12 countries | 11 countries | 10 countries | 23 countries |

Source: Hegre et al. (2016)
Annex 3: Probability of a country being in minor or major conflict by 2030

Source: Based on Hegre et al. (2016)
Annex 4: Primary and Lower Secondary Enrolment in Conflict-Affected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Primary Enrolment</th>
<th>Secondary Enrolment</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total number of</td>
<td>Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>out-of-school</td>
<td>(most current in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>children of</td>
<td>UIS database)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>primary school age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2,094,750</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>36,008</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>206,651</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>356,685</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>128,620</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>5,598,022</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>173,401</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,123,670</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>6,401,719</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>345,893</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1,029,672</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>284,278</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>173,764</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1,233,332</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>8,735,046</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>32,849</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5,611,792</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>402,182</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>140,613</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>67,642</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,022,073</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>46,806</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>2013</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>201,766</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>357,008</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>477,468</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>56,464</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>583,152</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>38,484,089</td>
<td>31,081,454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 5: Estimates of Out of school Children for Select Conflict-Affected Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage of OOSC living in conflict-affected areas (subnational)</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Estimate of OOSC in conflict-affected areas (based on UIS statistics / percentage of OOSC living in conflict-affected areas)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>EPDC 2010</td>
<td>314,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>EPDC 2010</td>
<td>67,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>EPDC 2010</td>
<td>51,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>EPDC 2010</td>
<td>2,295,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>DHS 2011 taking proportion of OOSC for Somali, Oromia and Tigray</td>
<td>169,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>DHS 2006 taking the &quot;red corridor&quot; + Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>1,664,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>EPDC 2010</td>
<td>345,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>EPDC 2010</td>
<td>68,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>% of OOSC population in Agadiz 2006</td>
<td>24,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>DHS 2008, NE region only</td>
<td>2,183,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>EPDC 2010</td>
<td>1,402,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>EPDC 2010</td>
<td>136,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>EPDC 2010</td>
<td>10,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>EPDC 2010</td>
<td>319,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>proportion of population affected</td>
<td>145,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Jones and Naylor, 2014a*
Annex 6: Educational interventions in emergencies

Educational Interventions for Syrian Children and Syrian Refugees

In addition to pushing children out of school, the conflict has had other impacts on Syrian children and adolescents who have managed to continue their education. Many children have needed alternative forms of schooling. The types of interventions vary widely depending on the location to which the student has been displaced.

Within Syria, the international community has demonstrated commitment to supporting Syrian children to ensure prevention of a "lost generation" due to loss of educational opportunity (UNICEF, 2015b). Temporary educational interventions and remedial schooling are essential ways to get Syrian children up to speed and help them re-enrol, whether within Syria or in a host country. UNICEF has developed several initiatives to support Syrian students, including self-learning kits, accelerated learning programs, and e-learning (UNICEF, 2015a).

Some refugee children have managed to access education in other countries. The majority of Syrian refugees are now living in these three countries, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey (RAND, 2015).

Strategies for providing refugees with access to education vary across the three countries. In Jordan, the Ministry of Education offers schooling within refugee camps and outside of the camps. New schools have been built to accommodate Syrian students, but demand far outpaces the amount of space available in the system (RAND, 2015).

In Lebanon, where there are no refugee camps, double shifts have been added to accommodate Syrian children, who now far outnumber Lebanese children in terms of demand for public education (RAND, 2015). Just 30% of Lebanese children (approximately 270,000 in 2014) attend public schools, while 70% enrol in private education (RAND, 2015). The additional 400,000 refugees in need of education has placed enormous strain on the Lebanese school system.

In Turkey, refugees can access Ministry of Education schooling within camps and outside of camps, although only 8,500 have enrolled in Turkish public schools (RAND, 2015). With the language of instruction in Turkish, Syrian children struggle to catch up with their peers. To respond to growing demand, UNICEF has built additional schools that offer shifts with instruction in Arabic. Syrians have also taken initiative to develop unregulated schools for their children; at least sixty of these schools were identified in 2014-2015 (RAND, 2015).

Analysing conflict and education with scarce quantitative data: The case of Afghanistan

With severe quantitative data paucity, we can turn to qualitative data for insight into the relationships between education and conflict. Afghanistan is a case of protracted conflict with very limited quantitative data on education. Researchers and international aid organizations have compiled qualitative evidence on successful types of programs, many of which operate at the community level, in this context in which education can itself exacerbate and provoke conflict.

Save the Children (2012) has documented the effectiveness of accelerated learning programs, which are community-based classes that support children who have not been able to access traditional schooling. In Afghanistan, where Save the Children implemented 772 accelerated learning programs and community-based classes in 2009, these programs had better results in gender equality and
quality of teaching and learning. Save the Children has also formed and trained parent-teacher organizations and student councils, which contributed to higher attendance rates. Burde (2014) found that community-based schools deter violent attacks on schools, increase student access to learning, and mitigate risk of appropriation of education for teaching of violent extremism. Involving the community and reducing the distance between home and school is a key positive facets of community schools. Similarly, Harmer (2011) points to the benefits aid organizations working through "remote management" and a cluster approach, which reduces visibility of the organizations and elevates the community role in education.
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